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WHONET: An Information
System for Monitoring
Antimicrobial Resistance
WHONET is an information system developed to
support The World Health Organization’s (WHO)
goal of global surveillance of bacterial resistance to
antimicrobial agents. Microbiologists, clinicians and
infection control workers may use its software to
enhance monitoring of drug resistance in their hos-
pitals and communities and to merge their files into
national, regional, and global networks for surveil-
lance of drug resistance. WHONET software can be
installed on personal computers and be configured
for the locations of the patients a laboratory serves
and for the antimicrobial agents it tests. The pro-
gram accepts susceptibility test results and allows
printing of reports and logbooks and retrieval of
data. If the laboratory already has a computerized
reporting system, a translation program can be cre-
ated to download the laboratory’s files into
WHONET. Either way, the microbiologists and other
infectious disease specialists gain new analytical
tools to monitor and manage susceptibility test qual-
ity and the spread of drug resistance locally and
outside their area.
WHONET can also analyze stored data. From a
single screen, a WHONET user selects the type of
analysis to run, the species of bacteria to analyze,
the subsets of isolates to include (e.g., all, isolates
from urine only, and isolates resistant to gentamicin
and from certain locations), and the antimicrobial
agents and period to examine. Types of analyses
include percentage of data categorized as resistant,
intermediate, or susceptible by standard or other
breakpoints; distributions of test measurements
(zone diameter, minimal inhibitory concentration) in
the form of histograms; scatterplots comparing
measurements for different agents or methods for
the same isolates; and line listings of isolates
grouped by combinations of agents to which they are
resistant (antibiotypes) to trace distinctive strains.
Isolates with uncommon antibiotypes can also be
flagged on entry so that they may be rechecked while
still available, and local outbreaks can be detected early.
Although test results are entered and monitored
locally on software configured for local use, they are
filed in a universal file format so that any copy of the
program can analyze the files of any laboratory. This
feature has enabled groups of users in 10 countries
to set up passive surveillance systems by pooling and
analyzing their files collaboratively. WHONET as-
sists such initiatives by providing file encryption
options to ensure confidentiality before data are
pooled and analyzed.
Ongoing local analysis by local workers is the
foundation of the system. It detects local problems
in testing, which no laboratory can avoid entirely,
and thus improves the overall quality of the files. It
delineates local spread of drug-resistant strains,
which aids infection control and can explain and
correct uncommon prevalence of certain types of
drug resistance at certain sites. It allows local work-
ers to distinguish their problems from those of other
sites and focus on infection control or antimicrobial
use that might be related to those problems.
Expansion of the system has been recommended
by the WHO Scientific Working Group on Monitor-
ing and Management of Bacterial Resistance to An-
timicrobial Agents. For more  information or for
participation contact 
Thomas F. O’Brien and John M. Stelling
WHO Collaborating Center for Surveillance of
Resistance to Antimicrobial Agents
Microbiology, Brigham and Women’s Hospital
Boston, MA 02115, USA
tel (1-617) 732-6803
fax (1-617) 732-4144
Internet: whonet@bustoff.bwh.harvard.edu
Recommendations for
Preventing the Spread of
Vancomycin Resistance
CDC’s Hospital Infection Control Practices Advi-
sory Committee (HICPAC) has published “Recom-
mendations for Preventing the Spread of
Vancomycin Resistance.” The recommendations fo-
cus on vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE).
The reported incidence of infection and coloniza-
tion with VRE in U.S. hospitals has increased rap-
idly in the last 5 years. This increase has
compounded the need for antimicrobial drugs to
treat VRE infections. Most VRE are also resistant to
multiple other drugs (e.g., aminoglycoside and am-
picillin), which have been used for treating VRE
infections. In addition, the possibility that the van-
comycin-resistance genes present in VRE may be
transferred to other gram-positive microorganisms,
especially Staphylococcus aureus, is a serious public
health concern.
Although the epidemiology of VRE has not been
fully elucidated, and most enterococcal infections
have been attributed to the patient’s endogenous
flora, recent studies have demonstrated that entero-
cocci, including VRE, can be spread directly from
patient to patient or indirectly by transient carriage
on the hands of personnel or contaminated environ-
mental surfaces and patient-care equipment.
In its recommendations, HICPAC stresses that
the prevention and control of vancomycin resistance
will require a coordinated, concerted effort from
various departments of a hospital. Because the rec-
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and further research is needed to find cost-effective
ways to control the spread of vancomycin resistance,
HICPAC strongly encourages hospitals to develop
their own institution-specific plans, which should
stress the following elements: 1) prudent vancomy-
cin use by clinicians, 2) education of hospital staff
regarding vancomycin resistance, 3) early detection
and prompt reporting of vancomycin resistance in
enterococci and other gram-positive  microorgan-
isms by the hospital microbiology laboratory, and 4)
immediate implementation of appropriate infection-
control measures to prevent person-to-person trans-
mission of VRE.
The recommendations were developed by
HICPAC’s Subcommittee on the Prevention and
Control of Antimicrobial-Resistant Microorganisms
in Hospitals and subject-matter experts and repre-
sentatives of the American Hospital Association,
American Society for Microbiology, Association for
Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiol-
ogy, Infectious Diseases Society of America, Society
for Healthcare Epidemiology of America, and Surgi-
cal Infection Society. The recommendations were
published in February in Infection Control and Hos-
pital Epidemiology 1995;16:105-13 and will also be
published in the April 1995 issue of the American
Journal for Infection Control.
Hospital Infection Control 
Practices Advisory Committee
National Center for Infectious Diseases
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Atlanta, Georgia, USA
Waterborne Cryptosporidiosis
Threat Addressed
Cryptosporidium parvum was first recognized as
a cause of human illness in 1976. From 1976 to 1982,
the disease was reported rarely in the United States,
primarily among the immunocompromised. In 1982,
the number of reported cases began to increase
dramatically along with the number of HIV-infected
persons; outbreaks among immunocompetent popu-
lations also were reported. Recent municipal water-
borne outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis in Texas (1984),
Georgia (1987), and Oregon (1992), and a massive
outbreak in Wisconsin in 1993 that affected more
than 400,000 persons have raised awareness about
the waterborne transmission of cryptosporidiosis.
Since 1993, several smaller cryptosporidiosis out-
breaks were reported in the United States: two were
related to drinking water, six were linked to recrea-
tional water, and one was foodborne.
Cryptosporidiosis is caused by ingestion of the
environmentally tough oocysts of the protozoan
parasite  C. parvum, an intracellular organism that
can replicate in the gut epithelial cells of most mam-
mals. Its oocyst is extremely resistant to chlorine,
which is commonly used to treat municipal water.
In healthy persons, the disease lasts 1 to 2 weeks
and can have considerable economic impact through
absenteeism of those affected. In the immunocom-
promised, the disease is often severe, lifelong, and
life-threatening. No effective therapy is available.
The magnitude of the 1993 Wisconsin outbreak
and its association with a municipal water plant
operating within existing state and federal regula-
tions underlined the need for improved surveillance
and coordination among public health agencies and
spurred efforts for regulatory standards for Crypto-
sporidium in drinking water. During 1995-1996, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in-
tends to implement the Information Collection Rule,
which requires utilities that serve populations of
100,000 or more and use surface water (lakes, rivers,
streams) to test that water routinely for Crypto-
sporidium oocysts. If oocysts are found, the utility
may also have to test finished water (tap water).
Utilities that serve populations of 10,000 to 99,000
will also have to test source water, but for a shorter
period. They will not be required to test tap water,
even if oocysts are found. Authority to issue boil
water advisories if oocysts are found varies from
state to state. The health risks from ingesting low
levels of Cryptosporidium are unknown. More than
300 representatives from 40 states and more than
25 regulatory, public health, water utility, and advo-
cacy groups met at the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta in September 1994
to discuss the prevention and control of waterborne
cryptosporidiosis. Recommendations from the CDC
workshop will be published in the next 2 to 3 months.
CDC held the first meeting of the Working Group
on Waterborne Cryptosporidiosis in November 1994.
The working group convenes biweekly by teleconfer-
ence. For more information about the group, contact
Margaret Hurd (phone: 404-488-7769, fax: 404-488-
7761).
The working group has three main purposes:
1) promote a regular exchange of ideas, goals, activi-
ties, and proposals among individual scientists,
agencies, and organizations interested in water-
borne cryptosporidiosis; 2) make decisions on public
health issues related to waterborne crypto-
sporidiosis; and 3) assemble smaller, more focused,
task forces with expertise to develop, implement,
and evaluate projects of the working group.
The working group has created task forces to
assist local, state, and national public health depart-
ments, water utilities, and regulatory agencies in
preparing for and managing outbreaks. The task
forces have the following responsibilities:
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